

# Florian Brandl

✉ [florian.brandl@uni-bonn.de](mailto:florian.brandl@uni-bonn.de) • [🌐 brandlf.com](https://brandlf.com)

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## Contact

Address     Institute for Microeconomics, University of Bonn  
              Lennéstraße 37  
              53113 Bonn  
              Germany

Email        [florian.brandl@uni-bonn.de](mailto:florian.brandl@uni-bonn.de)

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## Positions

2021–        **Argelander Professor** (W2, tenured), Department of Economics, University of Bonn

2021–        **Bonn Junior Fellow**, Hausdorff Center for Mathematics, University of Bonn

2021–2025   **Research Affiliate**, Global Priorities Institute, University of Oxford

2020–2021   **Postdoctoral research scholar**  
              Department of Economics, Princeton University

2019–2020   **Visiting postdoctoral scholar**  
              Department of Economics, Stanford University

2013–2018   **Graduate student**  
              Department of Mathematics, Technical University of Munich

## Education

2018        **Doctoral degree in Mathematics** (*summa cum laude*)  
              Department of Mathematics, Technical University of Munich  
              Thesis title: *Zero-Sum Games in Social Choice and Game Theory*  
              Thesis committee: Prof. Felix Brandt, Prof. Hervé Moulin, Prof. Clemens Puppe

2013        **Master's degree in Mathematics**  
              Department of Mathematics, Technical University of Munich  
              Thesis title: *Efficiency and Incentives in Randomized Social Choice*

2011        **Bachelor's degree in Mathematics** Department of Mathematics, Technical University of Munich  
              Thesis title: *Existence of Stability in Hedonic Coalition Formation Games*

## Grants

2019–2021   **DFG Research Fellowship**

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## Journal Articles

21. Efficient and fair healthcare rationing. *Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research*, 80, 2024 (with H. Aziz).
20. An axiomatic characterization of Nash equilibrium. *Theoretical Economics*, 19(4):1473–1504, 2024 (with F. Brandt).
19. A natural adaptive process for collective decision-making. *Theoretical Economics*, 19(2):667–703, 2024 (with F. Brandt).
18. The vigilant eating rule: A general approach for probabilistic economic design with constraints. *Games and Economic Behavior*, 135:168–187, 2022 (with H. Aziz).
17. Funding public projects: A case for the Nash product rule. *Journal of Mathematical Economics*, 99:102585, 2022 (with F. Brandt, M. Greger, D. Peters, C. Stricker, and W. Suksompong).
16. An analytical and experimental comparison of maximal lottery schemes. *Social Choice and Welfare*, 58(1):5–38, 2022 (with F. Brandt and C. Stricker).
15. Approval voting under dichotomous preferences: A catalogue of characterizations. *Journal of Economic Theory*, 205, 2022 (with D. Peters).
14. Belief-averaging and relative utilitarianism. *Journal of Economic Theory*, 198, 2021.
13. Arrovian aggregation of convex preferences. *Econometrica*, 88(2):799–844, 2020 (with F. Brandt).
12. Fractional hedonic games. *ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation*, 7(2):1–29, 2019 (with H. Aziz, F. Brandt, P. Harrenstein, M. Olsen, and D. Peters).
11. Justifying optimal play via consistency. *Theoretical Economics*, 14(4):1185–1201, 2019 (with F. Brandt).
10. Strategic abstention based on preference extensions: Positive results and computer-generated impossibilities. *Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research*, 66:1031–1056, 2019 (with F. Brandt, C. Geist, and J. Hofbauer).
9. Welfare maximization entices participation. *Games and Economic Behavior*, 14:308–314, 2019 (with F. Brandt and J. Hofbauer).
8. An axiomatic characterization of the Borda mean rule. *Social Choice and Welfare*, 52(4):685–707, 2019 (with D. Peters).
7. On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness. *Games and Economic Behavior*, 110:1–18, 2018 (with H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and M. Brill).
6. Proving the incompatibility of efficiency and strategyproofness via SMT solving. *Journal of the ACM*, 65(2):1–28, 2018 (with F. Brandt, M. Eberl, and C. Geist).
5. Two problems in max-size popular matchings. *Algorithmica*, 81(7):2738–2764, 2018 (with T. Kavitha).
4. The distribution of optimal strategies in symmetric zero-sum games. *Games and Economic Behavior*, 104:674–680, 2017.

3. Consistent probabilistic social choice. *Econometrica*, 84(5):1839–1880, 2016 (with F. Brandt and H. G. Seedig).
2. The impossibility of extending random dictatorship to weak preferences. *Economics Letters*, 141:44–47, 2016 (with F. Brandt and W. Suksompong).
1. Universal Pareto dominance and welfare for plausible utility functions. *Journal of Mathematical Economics*, 60:123–133, 2015 (with H. Aziz and F. Brandt).

### **Publications in Peer-Reviewed Conference Proceedings**

13. Efficient, fair, and incentive-compatible healthcare rationing. In *Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (ACM-EC)*, 103–104, 2021 (with H. Aziz).
12. Funding public projects: A case for the Nash product rule. In *Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)*, 2021 (with F. Brandt, M. Greger, D. Peters, C. Stricker, and W. Suksompong).
11. Distribution rules under dichotomous preferences: Two out of three ain't bad. In *Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (ACM-EC)*, 158–179, 2021 (with F. Brandt, D. Peters, and C. Stricker).
10. An analytical and experimental comparison of maximal lottery schemes. In *Proceedings of the 27th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI)*, 114–120, 2018 (with F. Brandt and C. Stricker).
9. Random assignment with optional participation. In *Proceedings of the 16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS)*, 326–334, 2017 (with F. Brandt and J. Hofbauer).
8. Popular matchings with multiple partners. In *Proceedings of the 37th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS)*, Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), 19:1–19:15. LZI, 2017 (with T. Kavitha).
7. Proving the incompatibility of efficiency and strategyproofness via SMT solving. In *Proceedings of the 25th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI)*, 116–122, 2016 (with F. Brandt and C. Geist).
6. Strategic abstention based on preference extensions: Positive results and computer-generated impossibilities. In *Proceedings of the 24th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI)*, 18–24, 2015 (with F. Brandt, C. Geist, and J. Hofbauer).
5. Incentives for participation and abstention in probabilistic social choice. In *Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS)*, 1411–1419, 2015 (with F. Brandt and J. Hofbauer).
4. Fractional hedonic games: Individual and group stability. In *Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS)*, 1219–1227, 2015 (with F. Brandt and M. Strobel).
3. On the incompatibility of efficiency and strategyproofness in randomized social choice. In *Proceedings of the 28th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)*, 545–551, 2014 (with H. Aziz and F. Brandt).

2. Universal Pareto dominance and welfare for plausible utility functions. In *Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (ACM-EC)*, 331–332, 2014 (with H. Aziz and F. Brandt).
1. Existence of stability in hedonic coalition formation games. In *Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS)*, 763–770, 2012 (with H. Aziz).

## Working Papers

4. Dividing a cake for the irrationally entitled. 2025 (with A. Mackenzie).
3. The social learning barrier. 2024.
2. Patience ensures fairness. 2024 (with A. Mackenzie).
1. Disinformation in the wald model. 2024 (with X. Shi).

## Recent Conference and Seminar Talks

2025	Humboldt University of Berlin, Symposium 75 years of Nash equilibrium (Oxford), Workshop on Economics, Statistics, and Mathematics (Milan-Bicoccia)
2024	University of New South Wales, Vienna Workshop on Social Choice and Fairness: Connecting Theory, Experiments and Applications (Vienna), Conference on Mechanism and Institution Design (Budapest), Workshop on Random Dynamical Systems, with applications in biology (Chicago), University of Warwick
2023	University of Montreal, Concordia University, SAET Conference (Paris), MSRI Workshop “Randomization, Neutrality, and Fairness” (Berkeley), Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
2022	9th Oxford Workshop on Global Priorities Research (Oxford), University of Hong Kong, Bielefeld University
2021	SET: Seminars in Economic Theory, Virtual Conference on Social Choice Theory and Applications (Online), Oxford Workshop on Global Priorities Research (Oxford), D-TEA 2021 (Paris), New Directions in Social Choice (Online), Hausdorff Center for Mathematics Symposium (Bonn), ETH, Bilkent University, COMSOC online seminar (Online)
2020	California Institute of Technology, Princeton University, Cornell University
2019	Stanford University

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## Editorial Activity

2025– Theoretical Economics (associate editor)

## Referring Journals

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC), Algorithmica (ALGO), American Economic Journal: Microeconomics (AEJ-Micro),

American Economic Review (AER), American Economic Review: Insights (AERI), Econometrica (ECMA), Economic Theory (ET), Erkenntnis, Games and Economic Behavior (GEB), International Journal of Game Theory (IJGT), Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (JAIR), Journal of Economic Theory (JET), Journal of Political Economy (JPE), Mathematical Social Sciences (MSS), Mathematics of Operations Research (MOR), Operations Research (OR), Review of Economic Studies (ReStud), Social Choice and Welfare (SCW), Theoretical Economics (TE), Theory and Decision (THEO)

### **Program Committee Memberships**

10th International Workshop on Computational Social Choice (COMSOC), 2025, 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (ACM-EC), 2023 (area chair), 9th International Workshop on Computational Social Choice (COMSOC), 2023, 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (ACM-EC), 2022, 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (ACM-EC), 2020, 27th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), 2018, 26th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), 2017, 25th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), 2016

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### **Teaching**

2022–	Course “Algorithmic Economics” (Master level)
2022–	Course “Decision Theory” (Master level)
2022	Course “Microeconomics II” (PhD level)
2021	Course “Topics in Microeconomic Theory” (PhD level)
2017–2018	Seminar “Markets, Algorithms, Incentives, and Networks” (Bachelor/Master level)
2016	Course “Algorithmic Game Theory” (Bachelor/Master level, teaching assistant)
2015	Seminar “Computational Social Choice” (Bachelor/Master level)
2014–2018	Seminar “Economics and Computation” (Master level)